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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
TONY VINA,

I

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

]
]

JEFFERSON INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NEW YORK, a corporation,
and TRANSWESTERN GENERAL
AGENCY, a corporation,

]
]
I

Case

Defendants-Respondents.
JEFFERSON INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NEW YORK,

]

Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
JON DUNN,
Third Party Defendant.

JOINT BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS JEFFERSON INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NEW YORK AND TRANSWESTERN GENERAL AGENCY

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondents (Jefferson herein) and (Transwestern
herein) are in general agreement with the facts as set forth
by the Appellant (Vina herein) in his Brief, however, certain
facts have been omitted by him which should be brought to
the attention of the Court.

I

(1)

The Appellant, Vina, and the Third Party

Defendant, Jon Dunn (Dunn herein), had done business with
one another for some time and Dunn had procured other insurance

i

policies for Vina both before the loss complained of and
afterwards (Finding of Fact No. 5, R-213,214,239), none of
which had been placed through Transwestern or issued by

<

Jefferson (R-237).
(2)

Dunn was not a licensed agent for Jefferson

or Transwestern, (Finding of Fact No. 5, R-428) and had not

<

executed an appointment as agent with Jefferson or Transwestern,
and had no binding authority from Jefferson nor authority to
issue or countersign any policies of insurance for that

^

company.
(3)

Dunn delivered the policy of insurance

issued by Transwestern on behalf of Jefferson to either Vina

^

or Pencille (R-268,400) at some time prior to the loss and
the policy was physically in the possession of Vina at the
time of the loss (R-226,268).
(4)

<

Vina had not complained as to the names of

the insureds shown on the policy to either Transwestern,
Jefferson, or to Dunn (R-228).
(5)

(

Vina filed his demand for payment with Trans-

western under the policy on the 2nd day of January 1980 (R-272),
the loss having occurred either on the evening of December

i

31, 1979, or January 1, and filed a complaint with the Utah
State Insurance Commission also on the 2nd of January 198 0.
<

(6)

Appellant in his statement of the facts

alleges that the Utah State Department of Insurance ordered
both of the Defendants (Jefferson and Transwestern) to pay
the claim of the Appellant.

This is not true, only Jefferson

was ordered to pay and it appealed that decision to the
Supreme Court, which appeal was subsequently dropped when
the instant action was filed in State District Court thereby
making the appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of the
Insurance Department moot.
(7)

Based upon the facts adduced at the trial the

Trial Court held that the relationship between the various
parties was that Dunn was at all times acting as a broker in
his dealings with Transwestern and Jefferson as that word
was defined under Utah Code Ann. § 31-17-2(1) (1953) (said
law has been subsequently amended) and, further, Dunn was
the agent of Vina and Pencille in all of his dealings with
them and with Transwestern and Jefferson (Conclusion of Law
No. 2, R-133).
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD
NOT BE DISTURBED AS APPELLANT HAS NOT
DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The law of Utah is clear that the Court's findings
of fact will not be disturbed unless the party attacking
those findings can demonstrate that they are clearly against

the weight of the evidence.

Barrett v. Vickers, 24 Utah 2d

334, 471 P.2d 157 (1970); Ream v. Fitzen, 581 P.2d 145 (Utah
1978); Ute-Cal Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981)•
Not only will the Supreme Court not disturb the
Trial Court's findings where there is clear weight supporting
<

the findings, Wasatch Bank v. Leany, 44 Utah Adv Rep 22
(1986) butf also, will not disturb the Findings of Fact
where the evidence only preponderates in favor of sustaining
i

the trial court.

Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d

1063 (1942); Arthur v. Chournos, 574 P.2d 723 (Utah 1978).
In Boccalero, the Supreme Court quoted from Justice
i

Wolfe's opinion in Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520f 94 P.2d
465 (1939) wherein he set up three criteria which if met
would preclude the Court from overturning the lower court's
i

decision.

today.

One of the criteria was that:
"We think the evidence as revealed by
the record may slightly preponderate
against its conclusions but such preponderance may well be offset in favor of
his conclusions by having seen the witnesses
and been able to judge by their demeanor
as to their credibility, then we will
not reverse."

{

The Stanley doctrine remains the law of Utah

\

To the same effect, see Nokes v. Continental Mining

& Milling Co.y 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 954 (1957).
Harward, 565 P.2d 70 (1977).

Harrop v.

However, see Footnote 2 to

<

Decision in Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250
(Utah 1985), wherein the court discusses two standards,
"substantial" or "clearly erroneous" and cites various Utah
cases in favor of either standard.
Vina's complaint seems to be founded upon the
principles of equity and the cases cited above go to appellate
review of equity cases and the standards therein applied.
See Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Const. Co., 677
P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984).

However, while the constitution of

Utah confers a right for the Supreme Court to make its own
findings in an equity case as opposed to a law case the
basic legal concepts of appellate procedure would be applicable
to both equity and law actions.
It is respectfully submitted that what Vina wants
the Supreme Court to do is to read and review the entire
record to ascertain if it can find sufficient facts to
sustain the Trial Court's decision.

This is not the burden

of the Supreme Court, this is the burden of the Appellant,
Vina.
It is also submitted that it is not the burden of
Transwestern or Jefferson to burrow through the record to
pull out the facts that sustain each of the Trial Court's
findings.

It is only their burden to show facts which

sustain the findings if Vina specifically attachs a finding

-5-

and attempts to demonstrate that the evidence did not sustain
that particular finding.
The burden is upon the Appellant, Vina, to demonstrate
i

that, even under the facts of the case, there is clear error
in the Court's findings. As pointed out in Scharf v. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985), it is the burden of the Appellant
i

to marshal all of the evidence and then demonstrate that
even in reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Trial Court's decision the evidence is still insufficient
to support the findings of the Trial Court.
The Supreme Court in Scharf pointed out that the
starting point, upon appeal, was not to argue the facts
contended at the time of trial, but to take the Findings of
Fact of the Trial Court and show that there was no evidence
to sustain them.

The Court observed:
i

"Nowhere does he (Appellant) marshal
the evidence supporting his version of
the facts, much less the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings.
Under these circumstances, we decline
to further consider Erickson's (Appellant) attack on the factual findings."

{

In J. & M. Const. Inc. v. Southam, 722 P.2d 779
(Utah 1986), the court after citing Scharf observed:
i

"When defendants have not supported
their argument or asserted facts with
any adequate, competent citations to
the record, this Court will not undertake an analysis of the evidence independent of the determinations reached

-6-

{

by the trial court. See State v.
Hutchings, 672 P.2d 404 (Utah 1983);
Unkerman v. Lincoln National Life
Insurance Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah
1978)."
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court's
findings should stand and that the Supreme Court should
follow Scharf and J. & M. Constr. Inc. and not require
itself or Respondents to attempt to justify the Trial Court's
findings.
Vina has not done this.

In short, the sole attack

of Vina to the lower court's ruling must be predicated upon
an attack upon the conclusions of law.
POINT TWO
UNDER UTAH LAW AND THE FACTS OF THIS
CASE, JON DUNN WAS THE AGENT OF TONY VINA.
Vinaf in his Brief, cites Utah Code Ann § 31-17-1
(1953), as it was enacted at the time of the events of this
matter, exactly for what purpose is not clear to these
respondents (statute is set forth in appendix).

Under the

facts of the case, that statute clearly negates the claim of
Vina that Dunn was the agent of either Transwestern or
Jefferson.
The statute defines an "agent" as one who is
"authorized" by the insurer (Jefferson).

The facts in this

case clearly showed that Dunn was not "authorized" by Jefferson
or Transwestern, but to the contrary was an independent
agent.

There was no authority in Dunn to solicit applications

for insurance for Jefferson or for Transwestern.

Dunn

merely wanted to obtain an insurance policy to cover his
clients (Vina and Pencille) at the cheapest premium that he
i

could find and he went to Transwestern for a premium quote
(Finding of Fact No, 7, R-4 31) to obtain that policy and
there was no evidence that he even cared from which company
i

he got the policy, but to the contrary, all he did care
about was the amount of the premium.

Clearly, Dunn was

acting for and on behalf of Vina.
Dunn had no authority to effectuate or to countersign
the policy and he had no binding authority to put coverage
into effect (R-409,431), although he obtained that authority
for that particular policy from Transwestern after Vina
elected to purchase the policy for the quoted premium, and
he did issue a binder, but it was only issued upon the
express permission of Transwestern and for that particular
risk (R-431).
The only thing that Dunn did have authority to do
was to collect the premium, which he did, in part.

The

facts showed, however, that while the whole premium was
paid, the payment was not made by Vina or Pencille, but was
made by Dunn, who advanced the premium payment to Transwestern,
and then attempted to collect the premium from Vina and
Pencille, which he only succeeded in doing after the policy
was canceled and Dunn got credit for the amount of the
returned unearned premium (R-417).

<

Clearly, under Utah Code Ann. § 31-17-1 (1953),
Dunn was not the agent of either Transwestern or Jefferson;
nor was he an agent of Transwestern or Jefferson under the
general law of agency.
Dunn was actually a broker (R-387) as defined
under Utah Code Ann. § 31-17-2 (1953), and this is specifically
what the Trial Court concluded from the facts as adduced
during the trial of the matter.

Vina in his Brief has

totally failed to show that the facts as adduced at the time
of trial were such that they did not establish that in fact
Dunn was a broker as defined under the Utah law.
Utah Code Ann. § 31-17-2 (1953), which was applicable
at the time the policy of insurance was written in April
1979 reads:
11

'Broker1 and 'nonresident broker'
defined.—'Broker' means any person
who, on behalf of the insured, for
compensation as an independent
contractor, or commission, or fee,
and not being an agent of the insurer,
solicits, negotiates, or procures insurance
or reinsurance or the renewal or continuance
thereof, or in any manner aids therein, for
insureds or prospective insureds other than
himself. A 'nonresident broker' is any such
person domiciled without this state and
acting as a broker as above defined in the
state of his domicile."
This section was amended, effective May 8, 1979, and at the
time of the loss read:
11

(1) 'Broker means any person who, on
behalf of the insured, as an independent
contractor for compensation [as an independent

contractor/ or commission/—or foe/] and not
[being] acting as an agent of the insurer,
solicits, negotiates, or procures insurance
or reinsurance [or the renewal or continuance
thereof^] or in any manner aids therein,
[#o£-] insureds or prospective insureds other
than himself. [A 'nonresident broker1—is any
such person domiciled without this state andacting as a broker as above defined in the
state of his domiciles] A broker is not an
agent or other representative of an insurer,
and does not have power, by his own act, to
bind the insurers upon any risk or with
reference to any contract.
" (2) If a person is licensed to act as an
insurance broker and as an insurance agent,"
he shall be deemed to be acting as an insurance
agent in the transaction of insurance placed
with those insurers for whom an appointment
had been filed with the commissioner in accordance with section 31-17-10 and which is then
in force.
"(3) A 'nonresident broker' is any such
person domiciled without this state and acting
as a broker as above defined in the state of
his or her domicile."
(Underlined portion indicates new material in the amended

*

i

(

{

statute and the line-through indicates the deleted wording
of the amended statute.)
Whether the law in effect when the policy was

(

issued or at the time that the policy was canceled, it is
submitted that it is immaterial as in either case Dunn was
still the agent of Vina.

{

The facts of this case show that Dunn indicated to
Transwestern that the relationship between Vina and Pencille
was that of a partnership (R-438) and that he thought it was

'

a partnership (R-473).

The policy of insurance that was

issued indicated that Vina and Pencille were doing business
together under an assumed name.

This policy of insurance

was given to Vina prior to the fire (R-228) and he made no
complaint about how the insureds were characterized on the
face of the policy.
The facts further showed that when the amount of
insurance coverage was reduced by Pencille, Vina gave only
an oral consent to the change, and then only to Dunn (R226), and, thus, by his silence established a course of
conduct with respect to the policy which confirmed with
Transwestern and Jefferson that Vina was just what the
policy showed, a partnership (R-414).
When the policy was canceled by Pencille through
Dunn, Transwestern and Jefferson had all the right to rely
upon such signed cancellation as one partner may bind the
other partner.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-6 (1953).

The conduct of Vina, Pencille, and Dunn acting
together or through their passive conduct created at least
partnership by estoppel under Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13 (1953)
(set forth in the appendix to this brief).

See Facit-

Addo, Inc., v. Davis Financial Corp., 134 Ariz. 6, 653 P.2d
356 (1982), an Arizona case which stresses the "reasonableness
of reliance" standard of the Arizona statute which is identical
with Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13 (1953).

-11-

The fact that insurance is involved does not
change the general principles of Agency Law,

The general

agency law of the United States is that an independent agent
who solicits insurance for the insured and places that
insurance with an agent of an insurance company is, if
anyone's agent, the agent of the insured and not of the
insurance company.

16 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice,

§ 8722 (1981).
One who secures insurance for another becomes an
agent of that person.

Orsi v. Aetna Ins. Co., 41 Wash. App.

283, 703 P.2d 1053 (1985).
In 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 113, 190, 191 (1981),
it is said:
"An insurance broker is primarily the
agent of the first person who employs him,
and ordinarily, where employed to procure
insurance, he becomes the agent of the
person for whom the insurance is procured,
at least insofar as all matters connected
with the procurement itself are concerned,
with the consequence that his acts and
representations within the scope of his
authority are binding upon the insured."
The facts are clear and found by the court to have
been proven by the defendants that Dunn was the agent of
Vina and as a matter of law, Vina is bound by the acts and
knowledge of that agent.

Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of

Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984).

-1 2-

Vina chose to entrust his insurance business to
Dunn, not only for this one policy, but for policies in the
past, and in so doing, the knowledge of Dunn is imputed to
Vina.

FMA Financial Corp, v. Hansen Dairy, Inc., 617 P.2d

327 (Utah 1980)
Nowhere in Vina's Brief does he attack this finding
by showing that such facts were not proven by a preponderance
of evidence.

Actually, it is not contended by Vina that

this was not what actually occurred.
POINT THREE
TO ESTABLISH AGENCY BY ESTOPPEL, VINA
HAD TO SHOW RELIANCE BY HIMSELF UPON
THE ACTS AND CONDUCT OF TRANSWESTERN
AND/OR JEFFERSON.
Vina in Point I of his Argument asserts that the
conduct of the parties could have created an agency by
estoppel.
However, Vina clearly stated at page 7 of Point I
of his Brief, that "At no time did Vina or Pencille have any
contact with either of the defendants."

Further, Vina did

not demonstrate that the finding by the Court that there was
no agency between Vina and Transwestern and Jefferson was in
error or that the finding was not supported by evidence,
and, thus, should be overturned on appeal.

Ercanbrack v.

Crandall-Walker Motor Co., 550 P.2d 723 (Utah 1976).

-13-

It is respectfully submitted that agency by estoppel
or apparent agency is a question of fact, Wilkerson v.
Stevens, 16 Utah 2d 424, 403 P.2d 31 (1965), and that to
prove such a fact, it is necessary to show the conduct of
the principal, as agency by estoppel is predicated upon the
apparent power of an agent to act.
The authoritative work cited by Vina in Point I of
his Brief, 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency, points out in § 79, a prior
section to the one cited by Vina, "Reminder" p. 586:
"Reminder: The apparent power of an
agent is to be determined by the acts of
the principal, and not by the acts of
the agent; a principal is responsible
for the acts of an agent within his
apparent authority only where the
principal by his acts or conduct has
clothed the agent with the appearance
of authority, and not where the agent's
own conduct and statements have created
the apparent authority."
This same work in § 80, p. 587, sets forth the
prerequisites for a finding of apparent power or agency by
estoppel and states:
"In order to establish that an agent
had the apparent authority to do the act
in question, it must be established (1)
that the principal has manifested his
consent to the exercise of such authority
or has knowingly permitted the agent to
assume the exercise of such authority,
(2) that the third person knew of the
facts and, acting in good faith, had
reason to believe, and did actually
believe, that the agent possessed such
authority; and (3) that the third person,

-14-

relying on such appearance of authority,
has changed his position and will be
injured or suffer loss if the act done
or transaction executed by the agent
does not bind the principal."
Vina does not state any facts from the record to
establish any of these criteria.
It is to be noted that "agency by estoppel" standing
by itself generally requires a change of position.

Restatement

(Second) of Agency § 8B, p. 38 (1958)
Vina does not allege any change of position nor
any evidence which, factually, demonstrated any such change
of evidence at the time of trial.
If Vina had no contact with Transwestern or Jefferson,
then any reliance that he may have given was based solely
upon the representations of Dunn and under the law he had no
right to so rely.
Vina cites Utah State Univ., etc., v. Sutro & Co.,
646 P.2d 715 (Utah 1982), which is a case involving stockbrokers
and the Utah State University officers on investments and is
not remotely involved with insurance and the general rules
of agency that are applicable to insurance agents and insurers
by reason of the Utah statutes applicable.
Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815 (Utah
1974), also cited in Point I of Vina's Brief, involved the
relationship of a real estate broker who was both selling
and buying real property and again had nothing to do with

-15-

insurance.

The quote from 3 Am Jur at page 9 of Vina's

Brief is a quote from a footnote in Foster and deals with
the effect of an agent selling his own property to his
principal which has nothing to do with the facts of the case
now before the Supreme Court,
POINT FOUR
<

DEFENDANTS HAD THE RIGHT TO RELY UPON
THE REPRESENTATIONS OF PLAINTIFFfS AGENT.
Plaintiff, in his Point II, attempts to assert
that Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern was a sole proprietorship.

*

However, plaintiff ignores the proven fact that the application,
as prepared, executed by the plaintiff, and delivered by his
agent, Dunn, to the defendant, Transwestern, clearly and

*

unequivocally showed that the relationship of plaintiff and
Beverly Pencille was that of a partnership.
The policy itself showed that the parties were
partners in the way the policy was styled:
"Beverly Pencille and Tony Vina,
d/b/a Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern"
Vina had the responsibility, if not the duty, to
read the policy, which he failed to do (R-269).

It has long

been the law that where one procures a policy of insurance
from a broker, which Dunn was in this case, the insured,
Vina, had a duty to read the policy and make such changes as
were required.

His failure to do so estopped him from later

— 1 C_

{

complaining.

Charstensen v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 8 Wash.

2d 72, 111 P.2d 565 (1941).

The law is clear that an insurance

policy will be enforced as written.

Wickes v. State Farm

Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 27 Utah 2d 350, 496 P.2d 267
(1972) .
Combining the representations of Dunn that Vina
and Pencille were partners, the conduct of the parties in
the amendment of the policy by Pencille alone, which was not
contested by Vina but acquiesced in by oral ratification by
him, clearly gave the right of Transwestern to rely upon the
fact that Pencille as partner had the right to bind the
partnership.

See:

Point Two above.

It is, therefore, submitted that the extensive
authority cited by Vina in Point II of his Brief, while
interesting, is misplaced and has no bearing under the facts
of this case.
Plaintiff completely failed to prove that the
defendants had any knowledge of separate ownership or interests
in the property insured.
failed to prove.

This was Vina's burden which he

No citation to the record is made by Vina

that he did in fact prove this point and it is submitted
that the record contains no such references.
As pointed out in the early case of Standard Oil
Co. v. Triumph Ins. Co., 64 N.Y. 85 (1876), that where an
insurance broker is employed by a party to effect insurance
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for himf the insurer has the right to rely upon that broker's
authority to act for the broker's principal in the procuring,
modifying, or canceling of that and other policies of insurance.
In the facts of the case now before the Court,
Dunn's responsibilities with respect to the policy went
beyond just obtaining the policy.

Dunn continued to act for

the insureds in the revision of the policy limits (R-444)
seeing that required repairs were accomplished (R-44 9) and
in the cancellation of the policy by getting the necessary
forms signed by Pencille to cancel the policy (R-454).
Thus, the argument and the citation of authority that Dunn's
authority ceased upon the issuance of the policy of insurance
i

does not conform to the evidence which was introduced at the
time of trial nor to the proven facts of this case.
As pointed out in 16 Appleman, Insurance Law and
Practice § 8730, 162:
"The fact that the insurance was really
intended for the benefit of one other than
the named insured would not bind the insurer,
where such intention, though known to the
broker, was not made known to the company."

{

In the case of Orsi v. Aetna Ins. Co., 41 Wash.
App. 233, 703 P.2d 1053 (1985), the Washington Appellate
Court held that where one is retained to acquire insurance
for another and clothed with the authority to determine
which insurance company will be chosen, the form of the

I
_1 Q _

policy and the amount of insurance, that agent has authority
to cancel a policy.

This case at p. 1057 then cites extensive

authority including Couch on Insurance for this proposition.
Under the facts of the case now before the Utah
high court, Dunn was given exclusive authority to place the
insurance with such company as he should select, taking into
account the premium therefor (R-488); the amount of insurance,
which he selected, later reduced by Pencille; and the form
of the policy (R-428,429).

Thus, under the facts of this

case, it squares directly with Orsi cited above.

The Annotation

referred to in that case, Annot., 83 A.L.R. 311 (1933),
cites other authority to the same effect.
A case arising in Oregon, Hiransomboon v. Unigard
Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Or. App. 493, 612 P.2d 306 (1980), held
that where the insured gave power to place policies into
effect through an agent due to the agent's expertise and
trust of the insured in the agent's discretion, the same
facts as found in the relationship between Vina and Dunn,
that relationship gave the agent the power to cancel a
policy and the insured was bound by what the agent did or
did not do and the remedy was between the insured and his
agent, not the insurance company.

In this case, the Oregon

Court expressly rejected the argument that an agent will not
bind his principal merely because it is an insurance matter
Hiransomboon, 612 P.2d at 308.
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It is respectfully submitted that the matter of
the authority of an agent is a matter of fact and that the
trial court found as a matter of law that the agency relationship
existed between Dunn and Vina (Conclusion of Law 2, R-133)f
and Vina upon appeal has shown no error on the part of the
trial court in making this finding.

He is bound thereby,

and it falls that as a matter of law, the cancellation of
the policy, upon express and written authorization of the
apparent partner of Vina, is binding upon Vina.

He may have

a complaint against Dunn and/or Pencille, but not against
Transwestern or Jefferson Insurance.
POINT FIVE
THE AMENDMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST DUNN DOES NOT
CONCERN TRANSWESTERN OR JEFFERSON.
In Point III of Vina's Brief, he asserts that the
Trial Court erred in not permitting Vina to file an amended
complaint against Dunn, seeking recovery against him for
negligence or breach of contract.
This is a matter strictly between Dunn and Vina
and Transwestern and Jefferson, having no interest in the
matter, decline to address this matter in their brief.
CONCLUSION
The respondents, Transwestern General Agency and
Jefferson Insurance Company, respectfully submit that the
Trial Court's finding of agency between Dunn and Vina is
conclusive and was founded upon sufficient and substantial

evidence and that the Appellant, Vina, has failed to demonstrate
or show that this finding was contrary to the evidence.
It is respectfully submitted that the cancellation
by Vina's partner, as shown on the insurance application,
was binding upon Vina as far as either Transwestern or
Jefferson are concerned and that the Court's judgment of
dismissal of Vina's complaint as to them was proper and
should be upheld by the Utah Supreme Court.
Respectfully submitted,

// PAUL N. COTRO-MANES
*S Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2377
Attorney for Transwestern

:D W. SLAGLE
Post Office Box 45^0j
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorney for Jefferson
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APPENDIX
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-13 (1953)

48-1-13- Partner by estoppel. (1) When a person by words spoken or
written or by conduct represents himself, or consents to another's representing him, to any one as a partner, in an existing partnership or with
one or more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such person
to whom such representation has been made who has on the faith of such
representation given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and, if
he has made such representation or consented to its being made in a public
manner, he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has
not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit by, or with
the knowledge of, the apparent partner making the representation or conl
senting to its being made.
(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were an
actual member of the partnership.
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly with the
other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or representation as
to incur liability; otherwise, separately.
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner m an
existing partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners he
is an agent of the persons consenting to such representation to bind them
to the same extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner
in fact with respect to persons who rely upon the representation. Where
all the* members of an existing partnership consent to the representation,
a partnership act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint
act or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting to the
representation.
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